…Or how to argue with post-racial one-worlder eschatologists.
“In 2007, Chinese geneticists discovered vast differences in the genetic makeup of Africans, Asians and Caucasians. They will soon report a breakthrough showing why some people — such as Tibetans — can live effortlessly at high altitudes while others can’t.”
–China pushing the envelope on science, and sometimes ethics, Washington Post, June 28, 2010
I’m sure that we all have heard some moron spout off about how the one-people post-’racial’ world is nigh. Post-racial one-worldism is the revelatory component of cultural Marxism. The best way to pop this delusion — which feeds the neoMarxist religiosity — is to point out the real inevitability: Cultural Nietzscheanism — the eventual differentiation of humans given the inevitable advances in medical genetics.
If a kind of Salteresque universal nationalism based on genetic interest is a relic of the 19th century. One-people cultural Marxism based on essential sameness is surely a relic of the 20th century. The future is clearly Cultural Nietzschean. While the WPost claims that there are vast average genetic differences between groups, the differences are, in fact, rather superficial — though nonetheless significant. Yet the event of genetic engineering will make inevitable large scale differentiation. Bioliberal transhumanism, unless aggressively regulated on an international scale, almost certainly will leads to large scare individual and group differentiation, if not speciation. It follows that the liberal-egalitarian-left’s “progressive” foundation is quite antiquated — the only way they can sustain it would be, ironically, to become radically bioconservative a la Salter.
From: Bioconservatism, bioliberalism, and the wisdom of reflecting on repugnance.
Roache R, Clarke S.
We consider the current debate between bioconservatives and their chief opponents–whom we dub bioliberals–about the moral acceptability of human enhancement and the policy implications of moral debates about enhancement. We argue that this debate has reached an impasse, largely because bioconservatives hold that we should honour intuitions about the special value of being human, even if we cannot identify reasons to ground those intuitions. We argue that although intuitions are often a reliable guide to belief and action, there are circumstances in which they are not reliable. Intuitions–including intuitions about enhancement–are subject to various cognitive biases rendering them unreliable in some circumstances. We argue that many bioconservative intuitions about enhancement are examples of such unreliable intuitions. Given this, it is unrealistic of bioconservatives to expect others to rely on their unexamined intuitions. Furthermore, refusing to engage in debates about the reasons and values that underpin their intuitions about enhancement will have the effect of making bioconservative voices less relevant in policy debates about enhancement than they would otherwise be.